Attorney Liability To Non-Clients When Issuing Oil and Gas Title Opinions by McDavid, John Land
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Annual of the Arkansas Natural Resources Law
Institute School of Law
2-1996
Attorney Liability To Non-Clients When Issuing
Oil and Gas Title Opinions
John Land McDavid
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/anrlaw
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual of
the Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact
scholar@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
McDavid, John Land, "Attorney Liability To Non-Clients When Issuing Oil and Gas Title Opinions" (1996). Annual of the Arkansas
Natural Resources Law Institute. Paper 31.
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/anrlaw/31
ATTORNEY LIABILITY TO 
NON-CLIENTS WHEN 
ISSUING OIL AND GAS TITLE
OPINIONS
John Land McDavid

ATTORNEY LIABILITY TO NON-CLIENTS WHEN 
ISSUING OIL AND GAS TITLE OPINIONS
John Land McDavid 
McDavid, Noblin & West PLLC 
Jackson, Mississippi
INTRODUCTION
Until recent years an attorney issuing a title opinion was not 
liable for malpractice except to his or her client because there 
was no privity between the attorney and a non-client. Stated 
differently, an attorney owes a duty only to his or her client.1 
The elements of an action for negligence are duty, breach, 
proximate cause and damages.2 Liability for negligent conduct may 
only be imposed where there is a duty of care owed by the defendant 
to the plaintiff; and, where there is no legal duty there can be no 
actionable negligence.3 The elements of legal malpractice are an 
attorney-client relationship, negligence, proximate cause and 
damages.4 The Mississippi Supreme Court compared the elements of 
negligence and the elements of legal malpractice and concluded: 
"[A]t most, a legal malpractice action is a negligence action 
dressed in its Sunday best."5 Attorneys issuing title opinions are 
still protected by the privity defense in most states. There is a 
minority view, however, apparently representing a trend, which no 
longer recognizes the lack of an attorney-client relationship as a
1
defense for attorneys issuing title opinions against claims by non-
clients.6
The cases which allow attorney liability to non-clients 
generally fall into three categories: (i) third-party beneficiary
contract theory, (ii) negligence of duty theory in tort and (iii) 
a hybrid theory originating in California and usually called the 
"balancing of factors" theory.7 Factors to be considered in the 
"balancing of factors" theory are: (i) the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (ii) the 
foreseeability of harm to him, (iii) the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury, (iv) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injuries suffered, (v) the 
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and (vi) the policy 
of preventing future harm.8 This paper will examine selected 
authorities and cases which reflect the minority view including the 
law in Arkansas. Finally, the avoidance or limitation of liability 
to non-clients will be considered.
ATTORNEY'S DUTY OF CARE
Before considering the main topic, a few general rules 
applicable to attorney liability will be stated to provide 
background and context:
[1.] [An attorney's] duty to his client requires [the] 
attorney to exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the 
legal profession similarly situated. He is not bound to 
exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable
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degree of care and skill, having reference to the 
character of the business he undertakes to do. Within 
this standard, he will be protected so long as he acts 
honestly and in good faith.9
[2.] If an attorney acts in good faith and in an honest 
belief that his acts and advice are well founded and in 
the best interest of his client, he is not held liable 
for a mere error of judgment. A fortiori, an attorney is 
not liable for an error in judgment on points of new 
occurrence or of nice or doubtful construction, or for a 
mistaken opinion on a point of law that has not been 
settled by a court of last resort on which reasonable 
doubt may well be entertained by informed lawyers.10
[3.] In the absence of an express agreement, an attorney 
is not an insurer or guarantor of the soundness of his 
opinion.11
[4.] An attorney in examining and reporting on a title is 
not a guarantor. He only undertakes to bring to the 
discharge of his duty a reasonable skill and diligence, 
and he is not liable for making a mistake with respect to 
a doubtful question of law.12
[5.] An attorney's non-compliance with a state code of 
professional responsibility is not malpractice per se.13
[6.] [Violation of] state codes of professional 
responsibility. . .  [cannot] form the basis of liability 
of an attorney to a non-client, even if such rules were 
violated by the attorney's negligent actions.14
THE LAW ACCORDING TO THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
Many of the cases which hold an attorney liable to a non-
client cite with approval Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) 
of the Law of Torts which provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has 
a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the 
guidance of others in their business transactions, is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by 
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he 
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in
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obtaining or communicating the information.15
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability 
stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of 
persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to 
supply the information or knows that the recipient 
intends to supply it; and16
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that 
he intends the information to influence or knows that the 
recipient so intends or in a substantially similar 
transaction.17
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to 
give the information extends to loss suffered by any of 
the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is 
created, in any of the transactions in which it is 
intended to protect them.18
It should be noted that this Section deals solely with
"pecuniary" loss and that liability of the attorney extends only to
the person to whom the attorney intends to supply the information
or knows that his client will supply the information in the event
the non-client relies upon the information. Section 552 describes
a very narrow and specific circle of persons to which the
attorney's liability extends. The Restatement makes this clear in
the Comments to this Section which read in part:
Although liability under the rule stated in this Section 
is based upon negligence of the actor in failing to 
exercise reasonable care or competence in supplying 
correct information, the scope of his liability is not 
determined by the rules that govern liability for the 
negligent supplying of chattels that imperil the security 
of the person, land or chattels of those to whom they are 
supplied (See §§ 388-402), or other negligent
misrepresentation that results in physical harm. (See §
311). When the harm that is caused is only pecuniary 
loss, the courts have found it necessary to adopt a more 
restricted rule of liability, because of the extent to 
which misinformation may be, and may be expected to be, 
circulated, and the magnitude of the losses which may
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follow from reliance upon it.
The liability stated in this Section is likewise more 
restricted than that for fraudulent misrepresentation 
stated in § 531. When there is no intent to deceive but 
only good faith coupled with negligence, the fault of the 
maker of the misrepresentation is sufficiently less to 
justify a narrower responsibility for its consequences.
* * * * *
On the other hand, it does not follow that every user of 
commercial information may hold every maker to a duty of 
care. Unlike the duty of honesty, the duty of care to be 
observed in supplying information for the use in 
commercial transactions implies an undertaking to observe 
a relative standard, which may be defined only in terms 
of the use to which the information will be put, weighed 
against the magnitude and probability of loss that might 
attend that use if the information proves to be 
incorrect. A user of commercial information cannot 
reasonably expect its maker to have undertaken to satisfy 
this obligation unless the terms of the obligation were 
known to him. Rather, one who relies upon information in 
connection with a commercial transaction may reasonably 
expect to hold the maker to a duty of care only in 
circumstances in which the maker was manifestly aware of 
a duty of care and the use to which the information was 
to be put and intended to solve it for that purpose. 19
* * * * *
The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies only when 
the defendant has a pecuniary interest in the transaction 
in which the information is given. If he has no 
pecuniary interest and the information is given purely 
gratuitously, he is under no duty to exercise reasonable 
care and competence in giving it.20
Sections 388 to 402 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
referred to in the comments discuss suppliers of chattels and 
"physical harm" caused by the use of the chattels.21 Section 395 
specifically provides for the liability of a manufacturer of a 
chattel for anyone who is harmed without the necessity of privity 
of contract.22 This Section states the law of MacPherson v. Buick
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Motor Co.23 Section 311 mentioned in the Comment deals with 
negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical harm.24 The 
Comment to Section 311 expressly states that this section 
represents a somewhat broader liability than the rules stated as 
to liability for pecuniary loss resulting from negligent 
misrepresentation stated in Section 552."25 It is clear from the 
Restatement that Section 552 prescribes a very small circle of non-
client liability. The Section is clearly distinguishable from 
other sections of the Restatement which cover products liability or 
negligent misrepresentation and have to do with chattels or 
physical damage.
THE LAW IN ARKANSAS
In 1987 the Arkansas Legislature adopted a statute prescribing 
an attorney's liability to non-clients.26 The statute has been 
described as "nothing more than a restatement of the general rule 
of liability".27 While this statement is substantially correct it 
does not do justice to this commendable statute. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-22-310 provides:
(a) No person licensed to practice law in Arkansas and no 
partnership or corporation of Arkansas licensed attorneys 
or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or 
shareholders shall be liable to persons not in privity of 
contract with the person, partnership, or corporation for 
civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, 
or other conduct in connection with professional services 
performed by the person, partnership, or corporation, 
except for:
(1) Acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that 
constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentations; or
(2) Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if 
the person, partnership, or corporation was aware that a 
primary intent of the client was for the professional
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services to benefit or influence the particular person 
bringing the action. For the purposes of this 
subdivision, if the person, partnership, or corporation:
(A) Identifies in writing to the client those 
persons who are intended to rely on the services, and
(B) Sends a copy of the writing or similar 
statement to those persons identified in the writing or 
statement, then the person, partnership, or corporation 
or any of its employees, partners, members, officers, or 
shareholders may be held liable only to the persons 
intended to so rely, in addition to those persons in 
privity of contract with the person, partnership, or 
corporation.
(b) This section shall apply only to acts, omissions, 
decisions, or other conduct in connection with 
professionals services occurring or rendered on or after 
April 6, 1987.28
This section does not provide a defense to actions involving 
fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious acts.29 Although it uses the 
terms "fraud" and "intentional misrepresentations" when discussing 
exceptions to the privity requirement, the exception includes 
intentional torts committed on third parties.30 The section was not 
intended to make attorneys immune from liability for damages in 
case of intentional tort, but it "appears to be a legislative 
statement that the privity requirement still exists in Arkansas in 
connection with contract or negligence actions."31 This statute 
substantially conforms to both the minority rule with respect to 
liability to non-clients and to Section 552 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts in that (i) the defense of privity is eliminated 
for those person or persons intended by the client and reasonably 
apparent to the attorney to be benefitted or influenced by the 
attorney's professional services and (ii) fraud, intentional 
misrepresentation and intentional torts are exceptions to the 
privity defense.
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Section 16-22-310 contains a feature which is probably unique 
to Arkansas. It provides that if the attorney identifies in 
writing to the client the persons who are intended to rely on the 
service and sends a copy of this statement to the non-clients 
identified as intended recipients of the services, then the 
attorney's liability will be limited to those persons so 
identified.32
Prior to the adoption of Section 16-22-310 the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held that for 
claims alleging negligent misrepresentation against attorneys the 
defense of privity applied.33 The court refused the plaintiff's 
urging that the court adopt the "better" or "more progressive" rule 
as set forth in Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.34 
In Robertson v White, the trustee in bankruptcy for a farmers co-op 
and a class of plaintiffs comprised of co-op members, distributees 
of patronage dividends and holders of demand notes and others sued 
numerous defendants including several attorneys involved in various 
transactions leading up to and, as alleged by the plaintiffs, 
resulting in the co-op's bankruptcy.35 Concerning the law in 
Arkansas the court stated:
In fact, it is a general rule of Arkansas contract law, 
(except in sales of goods), that consequential damages 
for faulty performance are strictly limited to those 
which necessarily flow from the breach, or which were 
tacitly agreed-to by the breaching party. [citation 
omitted] This rule is not direct or compelling authority 
for the court's position on this issue. Rather, the rule 
obliquely supports the court's determination in this way: 
the contractual relationship is initially consensual, and 
the Arkansas courts conceive that the relationship 
maintains its consensual character throughout, even to 
the point of holding that a breaching party must be found
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to have "assented to such a liability" before he might be 
charged with consequential damages for his breach, 
[citation omitted] Arkansas has held to this minority 
position even in the face of its decline elsewhere in the 
country. This court would find it hard to believe that 
Arkansas would broaden tort liability to innumerable 
third parties arising out of a contractual relationship, 
while it retains a strict limitation vis a vis the extent 
and kind of contractual remedies available to the parties 
in privity.36
In Almand v. Benton County, Arkansas.37 the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas again had 
occasion to consider the liability of an attorney to a non-client.38 
Section 16-22-310 was then in effect and the defending attorney 
plead this statute as a defense to all claims.39 The plaintiffs sued 
several law enforcement officials in Benton County, a savings bank 
and the attorney for the savings bank alleging civil rights 
violations under Section 1983 United States Code Annotated and made 
various state law claims which generally were in the nature of 
abuse of process and conversion of property growing out of the 
bank's aggressive collection activities in which it took into its 
possession cattle and equipment belonging to the plaintiffs.40 The 
jury found for the plaintiffs on a number of their claims and 
awarded judgements against the savings bank, the attorney and 
others. As stated, the defendant attorney pled Section 16-22-310 as 
a defense to all of these claims.41 The court stated after having 
reviewed the law in general and Section 16-22-310, that this 
statute was not meant to extend immunity from civil damages to 
intentional acts such as abuse of process or conversion.42 The court 
said that although the statute uses the terms "fraud" or 
"intentional misrepresentation" when discussing exceptions to the
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privity requirement, the exception includes intentional torts 
committed on third parties.43 The court did not believe the statute 
was intended to make attorneys immune from liability for damages in 
the case of intentional tort; rather that the statute appears to be 
a legislative statement that the privity requirement still exists 
in Arkansas in connection with contract or negligence actions,44 and 
that this may very well have been a legislative response to the 
erosion of the privity requirement in other aspects of the law as 
well as its erosion in connection with attorney liability to third 
parties.
In Wiseman v. Batchelor,45 decided in 1993, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that the immunity contained in Section 16-22-310 
included constructive fraud but not actual or intentional fraud.46 
The defendant's attorney, according to the plaintiff, had on behalf 
of his client: (i) filed a bankruptcy petition which was
dismissed (ii) which included an asset schedule which failed to 
list all of the client's assets and (iii) claimed an exemption of 
land for his client in bad faith.47 The plaintiff claimed actual 
fraud and constructive fraud based on alleged misrepresentations 
made by the attorney (the defendant) as attorney for the 
plaintiff's debtor in prior litigation.48 The plaintiff brought suit 
against the attorney who represented the debtor.49 He claimed that 
the attorney's actions, taken on behalf of his client, the debtor, 
prevented him from collecting a judgement against the debtor.50 The 
plaintiff claimed he had been damaged by the attorney's effort on 
behalf of the attorney's client.51 In disposing of the actual fraud
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claim, the court held that the complaint contained no allegation 
that the plaintiff relied on the attorney's misrepresentations, a 
necessary element for an actual fraud claim.52 With respect to 
constructive fraud, the court stated that ARK. CODE ANN. 16-22-310 
grants immunity to attorneys from lawsuits brought by persons not 
in privity with them except for actual fraud or intentional 
misrepresentation.53 The court also said that the exception appears 
to be one for intentional torts.54 Constructive fraud is not an 
intentional tort.55
As attorneys who regularly issue oil and gas title opinions 
sometimes prepare abstracts of title separate and apart from a 
title opinion, two Arkansas cases involving the liability of an 
abstractor to a third party should be considered. In Tapley v. 
Wright,56 a landowner caused the defendant abstract company to 
prepare an abstract for purposes of acquiring a real estate loan.57 
The loan was closed in due course.58 Subsequently the first lender 
sold the loan to the plaintiff.59 The plaintiff obtained a copy of 
the abstract and relied on it in acquiring the loan.60 Later, the 
plaintiff discovered the abstract contained certain defects which 
resulted in damages to the plaintiff.61 In sustaining the 
defendant's demurrer, the court stated there was no allegation that 
the defendant abstract company contracted with the landowner to 
prepare the abstract for the use and benefit of the plaintiff.62 The 
court stated that while the first lender might be liable to the 
plaintiff for furnishing to it a defective abstract, the defendant 
abstract company could not be liable in absence of an allegation
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that the first lender was acting as the agent of the defendant 
abstract company in furnishing the abstract as a part of the 
purchase of the loan.63 The court also observed that as the 
defendant abstract company did not contract to furnish an abstract 
to the plaintiff or to anyone for the plaintiff's use and benefit, 
the plaintiff had no cause of action against, the abstract company.64 
These statements as well as other comments in the opinion imply 
that the abstract company would be liable to the first lender if 
the abstract company knew the abstract was being prepared for the 
use and information of the first lender. This opinion implies that 
privity of contract is not an absolute defense against third party 
claims where the abstract company had knowledge the abstract was 
being expressly prepared for the use and benefit of a third party.
In Wright v. Allmon-Mack Agency, Inc.,65 an abstract of title 
was prepared, apparently at the request of a commissioner for the 
judicial sale of land, and furnished to a perspective purchaser, 
who, after having the abstract examined by his attorney, proceeded 
to close the sale.66 Afterwards, the purchasers discovered defects 
in the abstract and sued the abstract company.67 In sustaining the 
abstract company's demurrer, the court stated the law in Arkansas 
was that an abstractor's liability is not in tort but is 
contractual.68 The court noted that in Tapley v. Wright the court 
held there must be privity of contract between the abstractor and 
the person attempting to hold the abstractor liable.69 The court 
then went on to say that in the complaint it was not alleged on 
whom the demand for an abstract was made or that the abstractor
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knew the purpose for which the abstract was to be used.70 The court 
also stated that there was no allegation that the abstractor 
contracted with the plaintiffs to prepare an abstract for their use 
and benefit or that the abstractor knew the abstract was intended 
for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs.71 The decision implies 
that had the abstractor known the abstract was being prepared for 
the use and benefit of the plaintiffs, the abstractor would have 
been liable.
SELECTED TITLE OPINION CASES
Tennessee. In Citizens Bank of Gainesboro v. Williford.72 the 
defendant attorney was requested by his clients to prepare a deed 
of trust and title opinion covering farm land owned by them in 
connection with a loan from the bank.73 The land was already subject 
to a Production Credit Association (PCA) loan which was apparently 
noted in the attorney's title opinion.74 It was the practice of the 
bank to allow loan documents and title opinions to be prepared by 
their borrowers' attorney.75 The attorney searched the title, 
rendered a title opinion and prepared a second deed of trust which 
documents were delivered to the bank. The loan subsequently 
closed.76 Both the title opinion and the deed of trust generally 
described the land as containing 335 acres and then described by 
metes and bounds a tract which covered only 119. 6 acres.77 In 
addition, the title opinion referred to the estate of the borrowers 
as fee simple when they owned only mineral rights under a portion 
of 119.6 acres.78 The PCA loan foreclosed and the collateral did not
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sell for enough to pay off the first debt. As a result, the bank's 
lien was extinguished.79 The bank sued the attorney alleging it 
relied upon his title opinion, that had it known the true facts it 
would not have made the loan and that the attorney had failed to 
use and exercise reasonable care and diligence in preparing the 
opinion.80 The attorney defended on several grounds, the first of 
which was that this was a "legal malpractice" claim and only a 
client can maintain such a suit against an attorney.81 The Tennessee 
appellate court in deciding the defense was without merit stated 
that the attorney did the title opinion and deed of trust in the 
course of his employment for a price and he had full knowledge that 
the title opinion was to be used by his clients and the bank for 
the purpose of the loan.82 The court further stated that the purpose 
of the title opinion was to induce the bank to make the loan and in 
reliance upon the title opinion the loan was made.83 The decision 
gave no indication of the legal theory for its decision. The court 
cited and discussed briefly Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.84
Kentucky. In Seigle v. Jasper.85 the plaintiffs, purchasers of two 
lots, sued the seller for breach of warranty under the deed and the 
attorney who issued the title opinion in connection with the 
refinancing of the loan on one of the lots and the purchase of the 
other lot.86 The property was subject to a recorded pipeline 
easement.87 The deed contained an exception following the 
description of all "easements and restrictions of record and Zoning
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Regulations of Spencer County." 88 The court sustained the motion for 
a summary judgment in favor of the sellers on the basis that the 
deed exception covered the recorded easement.89 The attorney 
regularly did title searches, rendered title opinions and prepared 
loan documents for the lending bank in connection with its real 
estate loans.90 The plaintiffs agreed the attorney could perform the 
legal work and paid his fees as a part of closing costs.91 The title 
opinion made no mention of the pipeline easement.92 The attorney 
claimed he was not liable to the plaintiff because there was a lack 
of privity.93 The Kentucky appellate court held the attorney was 
acting in the course of his profession for his pecuniary interest 
when he failed to exercise reasonable care or competence in 
obtaining or communicating information and supplied false 
information for the guidance of the bank and the purchasers in the 
business transaction that subjected the plaintiff to a loss as a 
result of their justifiable reliance on the title opinion.94 The 
court indicated there was a question of fact as to whether a 
contractual relationship existed between the attorney and the 
purchasers.95 The court seemed to be taking the position that if the 
facts created a contractual relationship so that there was an 
attorney-client relationship then the attorney is liable for 
malpractice. On the other hand, if there was no attorney-client 
relationship, the attorney was, nevertheless, liable in tort to the 
purchaser because he knew the title opinion was being done for the 
benefit of the purchaser although rendered at the request of the 
bank. The court cited with approval Section 552 of the Restatement
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(Second) of Torts.96
Some other aspects of this case are of interest to title 
attorneys. One of the attorney's defenses was that the deed 
contained an exception for "easements or restrictions of record."97 
The court held his duty was not eliminated as he had a duty to 
specifically advise the parties of any restrictions on the title 
and to communicate any defect to the intended beneficiaries of his 
opinion.98 The opinion also contained a routine exception for 
"unrecorded easements."99 The court held that since the easement in 
question was recorded the exception did not apply.100 Finally, the 
opinion also obtained a routine exception for "rights or claims of 
parties other than the purchaser in actual possession of any or all 
of the real property."101 The court held this provision did not 
protect the attorney because the easement owner's acts of occupancy 
were not sufficiently open, visible and unequivocal to put the 
purchasers on inquiry.102
Mississippi. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Century 21 Deep 
South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson,103 extended the scope of attorney 
liability to non-clients further than any case reviewed in 
connection with this paper.104 In so doing the court apparently 
applied products liability to an attorney's title work done in 
preparing first and final certificates to obtain title insurance. 
Before considering this case, a review will be made to review 
certain legislative and legal developments leading up to the 
Century 21 decision.
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In 1976 the Mississippi legislature abolished the defense of 
privity "[i]n all causes of action for personal injury or property 
damage or economic loss brought on account of negligence, strict 
liability or breach of warranty, including actions brought under 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code."105 In a succession 
of cases the Mississippi Supreme Court held that privity was not a 
defense for: a home builder as against a subsequent purchaser;106 
a pest control operator against a homeowner who had not employed 
his services;107 a subsequent purchaser against a construction 
company;108 a firm of CPA's as against investors who claimed 
reliance on an independent audit;109 and a doctor who inadvertently 
treated a non-patient.110
At the same time these cases were being decided, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court was also deciding a series of cases in 
which the Court held the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship was necessary in order to maintain a legal malpractice 
action.111
When the Century 21 case reached the Supreme Court it 
apparently found itself with a situation where, on one hand, it had 
rendered a number of decisions holding that MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 
(1975 Supp.) had eliminated the defense of privity for accountants, 
doctors and other trades and businesses while, on the other hand, 
it had rendered a series of cases holding that the attorney-client 
relationship (privity) was required for a malpractice action 
against an attorney although the latter cases did not always 
involve a plaintiff who was clearly a non-client. In Century 21
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the court apparently felt compelled to make it clear that MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 11-7-20 applied to attorneys. In its concluding discussion, 
the court stated: "Today we modify the requirements of legal 
malpractice actions based on an attorney's negligence in performing 
title work by abolishing the requirement of attorney-client 
relationship and extending liability to foreseeable third parties 
who detrimentally rely as we have done in cases involving other 
professions."112
In Century 21 the court held the defendant attorney liable to 
non-clients even though the non-clients (plaintiffs: (i) were not 
aware of the existence of the defendant attorney or of any work he 
had done until two years after they had purchased the property; 
(ii) had no contact whatsoever with the defendant attorney prior to 
the purchase of the property; (iii) did not hire the defendant 
attorney; (iv) did not pay the defendant attorney any fee in 
connection with the purchase of the property; (v) did not rely on 
any work done or title certificate or title opinions prepared or 
issued by defendant attorney prior to purchase of the property; and 
(vi) at no time in connection with the purchase of the property 
considered the defendant attorney to be their attorney. Further, 
the closing attorney who did the title work for plaintiffs made no 
requests of or had no receipt of any of the work of the defendant 
attorney and did not rely on any work by defendant attorney. It is 
probable the closing attorney did not even know the defendant 
attorney had done any work in connection with the subject 
property.
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A Mr. and Mrs. Meiers purchased the property and the defendant 
attorney issued an attorney's first certificate and final 
certificate to a title insurance company in connection with a 
mortgagee's policy given to the holder of the purchase money 
mortgage on this subject property.113 At the time the acquisition 
and loan were closed and the title certificates and title policy 
issued, the property was subject to four liens totaling $7,226.06. 
One was a federal tax lien in excess of $6,000.00 and the remainder 
were three small liens in favor of the Mississippi Employment 
Security Commission. The Meiers moved into their house and enjoyed 
the property without incident or any knowledge of the liens for 
approximately one and one half years.114 They then sold the house to 
the plaintiffs.115 The real estate firm involved in the sale 
referred the plaintiff to an attorney (not the defendant attorney) 
who issued a "downdated" title opinion.116 The title opinion in two 
instances made the certification date the exact date and time of 
the filing of the purchase money mortgage given by the Meiers.117 It 
was apparently the practice in the community to give "downdated" 
title opinions when the purchasers were assuming a loan.118 As a 
result the downdated opinion did not reflect the liens.119 The 
plaintiffs moved into the property and lived there without incident 
or any knowledge of the liens for nearly two years when they 
decided to purchase a computer.120 A bank required they give a 
second mortgage on their property to secure the loan for the 
computer.121 It was at this time a third attorney made a full and 
complete examination of the title and, as the Court stated,
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"quickly" discovered the liens.122
The court held that a copy of the title opinion is not 
necessary and the client of an attorney performing a subsequent 
update relies upon the fact that the prior title opinion revealed 
any encumbrances or deficiencies of title.123 The court also stated 
that "[r]eliance on a licensed professional to perform his work 
competently is intimately reasonable."124 The court also said that 
"[a]n attorney performing title work will be liable to reasonably 
foreseeable persons who, for a proper business purpose, 
detrimentally rely on the attorney's title work, suffering loss 
proximately caused by his negligence.125
AVOIDANCE OF LIABILITY TO NON-CLIENTS
As attorneys can be liable in the performance of legal 
services to non-clients in most jurisdictions under certain facts 
and circumstance, consideration should be given to ways in which an 
attorney can avoid liability in those instances in which the 
attorney does not desire to be professionally liable to a non-
client.
Arkansas attorneys have the benefit of the Arkansas Real 
Estate Title Examination Standards. Compliance with these 
standards in the issuance of title opinions should provide a 
defense to claims by either clients or non-clients.
Arkansas attorneys should take advantage of the provisions of 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310 by identifying in writing to the client
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non-clients to whom the attorney will be liable and by sending a 
copy to the non-clients. While the statute does not specifically 
provide for the situation where an attorney does not intend to be 
liable to anyone other than the client, the statute does not 
prohibit an attorney from so notifying his client and thereby 
excluding all others.
In Touche Ross, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that the 
accounting firm remained "free to limit the dissemination of [its] 
opinion through a separate agreement with the audited entity.126 In 
Century 21, (which involved an attorney) the Mississippi Supreme 
Court pointed out that in Touche Ross the court had advised 
auditors "they could protect themselves from liability to an 
unlimited number of users by entering into an agreement with the 
audited entity limiting dissemination of the audits."127 The court 
made no further comments or explanation relative to this suggested 
procedure for limiting liability.
The most common devise to limit liability in the issuance of 
title opinions and other opinions of counsel are "reliance" 
provisions usually placed at the conclusion of a written opinion. 
Examples of such provisions are:
[1.] A copy of this Opinion Letter may be delivered by 
you to [lending bank] [syndicate participants]
[subsequent purchasers] [rating agency] [other] in 
connection with [state purpose], and such [person] 
[persons] may rely on this Opinion Letter as if it were 
addressed and had been delivered to [it] [them] on the 
date hereof. Subject to the foregoing, this Opinion 
Letter may be relied upon by you only in connection with 
the Transaction and may not be used or relied upon by you 
or any other person for any purpose whatsoever, except to
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the extent authorized in the Accord, without in each 
instance our prior written consent.128
[2.] This Opinion is being rendered solely for your
benefit in connection with ______________________ . This
opinion is not intended for the use by any person not 
affiliated with or under contract with you. Anyone not 
affiliated or under contract with you who attempts to 
rely on this opinion without prior written consent from 
this firm, shall do so at their sole risk and, by doing 
so, shall waive any claim against this firm such 
reliance.129
[3.] Pending satisfaction of the requirements set forth 
hereinabove the title to the captioned lands is not 
approved. This preliminary title opinion is rendered 
solely and exclusively for the use and benefit of 
addressee and is not a representation to the title to the 
captioned premises to any other party; it should not be 
relied upon by any other person or entity for any purpose 
whatsoever. Further, any utilization of this title 
opinion by any other person or entity is expressly 
prohibited without the prior express written consent of 
the undersigned.130
[4.] This Original Drilling Title Opinion is a 
confidential communication between McDavid, Noblin & West
and its client, ______________________________  and is not
intended to establish, and shall not be deemed to 
establish, an attorney-client relationship between said 
firm and any other party. Nor is this Title Opinion for 
the benefit of or advice to or to be used by any other 
party. Use of this Title Opinion by any other party 
constitutes a waiver and release of any claim or cause of 
action against this firm. We expressly reject the 
establishment of an attorney-client relationship with any 
other party.131
CONCLUSION
Except in the majority of states where privity of contract 
continues to be a defense to a suit by a non-client and in 
Mississippi where a products liability theory has been applied, the 
law in Arkansas and the law in the remainder of the jurisdictions 
is that an attorney when performing legal services will be liable 
only to those non-clients whom he or she reasonably knew or
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expected would rely on his legal services in connection with a 
particular transaction known to the attorney and for which he 
received a legal fee and which client relied on the attorney's work 
and suffered pecuniary damages as a result thereof. Attorneys who 
prepare title opinions and written opinions of counsel should be 
aware they can be liable to non-clients as well as clients for 
errors and omissions in the opinions. Before issuing an opinion, 
an attorney should clearly have in mind who is the client and who, 
if anyone, are non-clients which might reasonably rely on the 
opinion. When the attorney has identified the client and the non-
client to whom professional liability is intended, the attorney 
should then do everything possible to limit liability to the 
intended parties and to exclude everyone else. Arkansas attorneys 
can take advantage of the provision of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310. 
Attorneys in all jurisdictions can use a "reliance" provision at 
the conclusion of an opinion and/or separate letters, agreements 
and waivers. Attorneys should not hesitate to limit their 
professional liability to only those persons to whom the attorney 
has willingly and intentionally provided legal services.
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APPENDIX
REPRESENTATION LETTER 
(Normal One Client Paying the Entire Fee)
December 22, 1995
Buyer's Name Seller's Name
Buyer's Address Seller's Address
Dear Mr. & (Buyer) and Mr. & Mrs. (Seller):
This will confirm that the closing for the sale of the 
Sellers, personal residence to the Buyers will be completed on 
(date). At that time, all of the closing documents will be 
executed.
You have asked that I prepare the documentation to complete 
this transaction. However, I wish to make it clearly understood 
that I am representing the Sellers only. While I believe that all 
of the paperwork is in order and this transaction will close to 
everyone's satisfaction, I make no representations to the Buyers as 
to the transaction insofar as it may relate to their interests. 
The Buyers can and should rely on my certificate of title and the 
legal validity of any document which I prepare.
Any legal advice that I render will be to the benefit of my 
clients, the Sellers. My fees in this matter will be directed to 
and are to be paid by the Sellers. Certainly, the Buyers are free 
to obtain legal representation and I will be happy to cooperate 
with their legal representatives.
If any of you have any questions concerning my role with 
respect to this transaction, please feel free to call me. However, 
in the event that you are satisfied with the situation as it 
currently exists, I would appreciate you acknowledging receipt of 
this letter by signing where indicated and returning a signed copy 
to me. The additional copy is for your file.
I look forward to seeing you at the closing.
Very truly yours,
Attorney
BUYER SELLER
BUYER SELLER
K.F. Boackle, Jackson, Mississippi
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GRANTOR'S WAIVER OF TITLE SEARCH
TO: (Attorney's Name) Date:
IN RE: (legal description of property)
Grantee(s): Buyer's Name
We acknowledge that you have advised us that you have made no 
search or examination of the title, nor have you made any 
representation, express or implied, as to the status of said title 
to the guarantees.
We further acknowledge that you have made no
investigation as to the status of the loan or loans secured by said 
real estate, or their assumability and we accept personal 
responsibility for the aforesaid determinations.
We further acknowledge that as grantors (sellers) we are 
making certain warranties to the Grantee(s), namely the covenants 
of:
(1) Seizen
(2) Power to Sell
(3) Freedom from Encumbrances
(4) Quiet Enjoyment
(5) Warranty of Title
We further acknowledge that you have merely prepared the 
general warranty deed for us, based solely on information furnished 
by us and have made no independent investigation in connection 
therewith.
We further acknowledge that you will not record the deed 
or perform any other legal services, or file any tax reports with 
the local, state, or federal taxing authorities; and we accept 
personal responsibility for said recording and filing of said 
reports and all attendant requirements.
Grantor/Seller
Grantor/Seller
K.F. Boackle, Jackson, Mississippi
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GRANTEE'S WAIVER OF TITLE SEARCH
TO: (Attorney's Name) Date:
IN RE: (legal description of property)
Purchased from: (Seller's Name)
We acknowledge that you have advised us that you have 
made no search or examination of the title, nor have you made any 
representation, express or implied, as to the status of said title.
We further acknowledge that you have made no 
investigation as to the status of the loan or loans secured by said 
real estate, or their assumability, whether they contain dragnet or 
further advance clauses, or whether they are in good standing, and 
we accept personal responsibility for the aforesaid determinations.
We further acknowledge your advice that "we should secure 
evidence of seller's title, either by a certificate of title 
certified to the date of our purchase or by Owner's Title Insurance 
insuring our title." However, we decline either form of title 
evidence and are willing to accept the seller's deed conveying said 
real estate.
We further acknowledge that you have merely prepared the 
deed based solely on information furnished by the sellers, and have 
made no independent investigation in connection therewith.
We further acknowledge that you will not record the deed 
or perform any other legal services, or file any tax reports with 
the local, state, or federal taxing authorities; and we accept 
personal responsibility for said recording and filing of said 
reports and all attendant requirements.
Grantee/Buyer
Grantee/Buyer
K.F. Boackle, Jackson, Mississippi
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